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Abstract 
Process history is essential when reviewing operator alarm limits in the context of alarm 
stewardship and formal rationalization. Far too often limits are implemented on a ‘try-it-and-see’ 
approach that leads to higher operator load weakening the operators’ trust in the alarm system, 
potentially leading to delays in acting, and adding extra work later in re-reviewing the limits. 
Reasons for not making full use of the process history currently in review may include the 
complexity of the data and perceived overhead of including it in the review. In this paper we 
demonstrate techniques of data analysis based on the parallel coordinate plot that streamline and 
improve this, enabling the inclusion and reference to process operating envelopes in all alarm 
reviews. 
Operator alarms are essential for the economic operation of process plants, avoiding process 
downtime and contribute to increased process safety. There has been much recent attention on 
these systems and the introduction of the EEMUA 191 guidelines and IEC62682 standard for the 
management systems concerned with alarms. Little detail is provided for the practice of setting 
these alarm limits. In most approaches to alarm limit setting and philosophies, while attention is 
paid to consequences and consequence threshold, current process performance and capability is 
rarely considered in this process. This leads to alarm sets that cause unacceptable operator 
performance and do not contribute to improved operation or safety. 
Including historic process data in the alarm rationalization process is required to avoid these 
pitfalls. The size of the required datasets, and the difficulty of visualizing, let alone interrogating, 
this data using traditional methods, has led to adapting the parallel coordinate projection as the 
enabling technique for visualizing sets of alarm limits and their relationship with operating 
history, operating envelopes, and operator response. 
Using interrogative visualization of process history in the alarm review context increases 
effectiveness, producing limits that already consider process operation, and identifying early in 
the process issues that are usually only seen after the new limits have been put in place, allowing 
necessary operational and engineering changes to be investigates months or more earlier than 
now, while producing a set of limits consistent with this operation. These methods also increase 
the speed of the review, allowing smaller teams to perform most of the work independently and 
providing a common framework for communication. 
Pitfalls and issues that can be identified by using the historic data include mis-sized equipment, 
poor control, lack of capability and failed equipment. We demonstrate how these are identified in 
the context of alarm review. 
Introduction 
Operator alarms are the first line of defence in process plants, visually and audibly alerting the 
operator to undesired, potentially dangerous, process conditions that deviate from the normal 
carefully designed operation. Operator alarms are not the only defence from process excursions. 
In addition, automatic safety systems such as trip systems, interlocks, bursting disks, pressure 
relief valves, etc., should bring the plant to a stable, safe, shutdown if process deviations persist 
or get larger. However, the activation of these systems typically has a large economic cost. Their 
action causes process disturbances with effects ranging from minutes of degraded operation to a 
full plant trip, requiring hours or days to come back fully online with additional risks during 
shutdown and restart. Operator alarms help avoid these systems activating by alerting the 
operator to take more benign action to keep the process from activating these safety systems or to 
bring the process down in a controlled fashion. Thus, one measure of the goodness of an alarm 
system is the number of incidents and duration of downtime due to activation of these automatic 
systems.  
An essential part of a well-functioning alarm system is team-based design and review of alarms 
and their interaction with the process. The tools and information used in the process include 
design limits, design operating limits and regions, equipment limits, and HAZOP studies. These 
are essential for alarm review but are often insufficient. Some of the things that may have 
changed since the alarm setpoints were reviewed are deliberate equipment modification/plant 
change, equipment wear, changing feedstocks either discrete as to a different supplier or 
continuous as with reservoir aging or changes due to production rate, changing plant operating 
targets, equipment/catalyst aging and degradation, etc. Some of these things are deliberately 
planned and should include alarm review as part of the implementation process, but some are 
unplanned, or even unknown, and can have an effect on plant operations and therefore alarm 
systems. Other things may also impact alarm performance, like equipment faults, operator action, 
or errors in setting limits in the past. 
The Objective of Operator Alarms 
Figure 1 shows a conceptual idea of an alarm system. The diagram on the left alarm limits are 
positioned at the edge of green normal operation. These alarms will capture deviations from 
normal expected operation, giving the operator maximum time to take action before an automatic 
action is triggered, with three possible interim goals. The operator can take action to return the 
unit to normal operation by adjusting process inputs or requesting diagnosis or maintenance. 
Especially in the case of maintenance, this may be a slow process and other, more immediate, 
action may be required as well. The operator can maintain the system in an abnormal, degraded 
state, for instance by relying on a field operator to monitor a level while waiting for maintenance 
or periodically checking a level to ensure it doesn’t go yet higher. If neither of these two sorts of 
actions are sufficient, the operator can begin a part or full shutdown or unit isolation in a more 
benign manner than would result if the automatic safety systems activated.  
 
Figure 1: Schematic depiction of alarm limits. On the left, the expected configuration of alarm 
limits at the edge of normal operation. On the right, a more realistic picture of what is commonly 
seen in practice. 
The primary goal of operator alarms is to increase performance of a unit by minimizing reduced 
capacity resulting from trips, downtime, maintenance issues, and improving on-spec and efficient 
operation. The key measures of this are economic: frequency of trips and periods of resulting 
recovery as well as overall plant efficiency. Evaluating normal human factor KPIs (annunciation 
rate, standing alarm count) are a necessary minimum for operators to be able to respond, but 
alone do not capture the alarm system quality. As alarms must direct behaviour, alarms that don’t 
or can’t direct action when it is required are also poorly set, but will never appear from a review 
of historic alarm events. 
Many sources of information feed into alarm review including design, HAZOP studies, LOPA 
analysis, operation and alarm philosophy, and control system capability, but process history is 
one that is often overlooked. Sometimes spot values or a brief recent period of process 
information are all that are examined. This data is nearly always examined in isolation, 
individually for each variable as it is considered. What is often needed is to consider process 
history, including controller outputs and setpoints, for a year or more (to include seasonal 
variation) across a piece of equipment or even a unit.  
Visualizing Process History with Parallel Coordinates  
In order to set the alarm limits at the boundary of normal operation, it is essential to define 
normal operation. For a plant that has been running some time, this is implicit in the data in the 
plant historian, and this data constitutes the space of historical operation. There is a 
corresponding ‘operating envelope’ that corresponds to this historical operation. The term 
‘envelope’ is used to describe a closed boundary between an inside and an outside space. In two 
dimensions the boundary is a closed curve that separates two areas. In three dimensions the 
boundary is a surface. For use in alarms, the data needs to be filtered to remove periods of trips, 
shutdowns, and other abnormal operation to arrive at a normal operating envelope. This is not 
the same as ideal operation which occurs much more rarely. In a process unit of any reasonable 
size, it is likely that there are instrument or operational issues ongoing at any point in time. In 
these cases, one would expect alarms, if not shelved or suppressed, on variables around the 
faults, so normal operation also doesn’t necessarily correspond to alarm-free operation. 
Many of the process constraints are relationships between two or more variables, and if these are 
plotted for a single pair of variables at a single point in time, would look something like the left 
image in Figure 2. The constraint relationship between these two variables will change as other 
process variables change, resulting in a sequence of two-dimensional spaces as seen in the right 
image in Figure 2. Conceptually, all of these constraints together constitute our operating 
envelope. While some of these, such as production targets, product qualities, and equipment 
operating limits are known and understood, other constraints are hidden deep in the 
thermodynamics, chemistry, and fluid dynamics of the process and are not explicitly known in 
detail. They are implicit in our space of historic normal operation, though.  
 
Figure 2: Schematic of two-dimensional operating envelope. Black lines are initial constraints on 
these variables. Blue lines show the constraints sometime later, with a shifted operating 
envelope. 
Alarm limits and operating limits are nearly always defined as high and low values on a single 
variable so are by definition independent of any other process variable. Where more 
sophisticated relationships are used, calculated variables are introduced so that the alarms are 
still high or low values.  They appear as vertical or horizontal lines when drawn onto our picture 
of a simple operating envelope. Figure 3 shows high and low limits for both PV1 and PV2 in 
green and two high safety system limits in brown. 
 
Figure 3: The relationship of operating envelope (red) with alarm limits (green) and safety 
system limits (brown). 
This 2-d picture is conceptually convenient, but any interesting process has many more variables 
in our envelope. It would be useful to have a picture or graph that allows this extension to many 
more dimensions.  
The solution is Inselberg’s parallel coordinate transformation where the axes are drawn parallel 
to each other [Inselberg, 2009], introduced in Figure 4. Each variable has its own axis just as in a 
conventional graph.  A set of related variable values, most commonly related by a moment in 
time, are plotted on their own axes and the values are joined with straight lines to give a zigzag 
line which indicates that these values ‘belong’ together. The zigzag line is a representation of a 
point in time. The individual variable values are the coordinates of the point.  
 
Figure 4: a parallel coordinate representation of 27 process variables at a single point in time. 
The power of graphs is exploiting humans’ visual pattern recognition capabilities. To exploit 
this, any useful graph must show many points, and the parallel coordinate graph produces its 
own set of patterns. This data in Figure 5 represents 3 months of operation of an hydro-
desulphurisation (HDS) unit and was taken from the process historian database at 10-minute 
intervals to give a total of 13,444 time points, each plotted as a zigzag lines. The dataset has a 
total of 175 variables. Patterns among the lines are apparent and can be correlated to process 
behaviour. Conditions under which the process has often operated are darkly coloured, those 
with rare operation such as transitions between modes have sparse lines. Additionally, 
relationships between the axes are apparent, and banding shows correlation between operations 
across different variables in the unit. 
 
 
Figure 5: three months of operation at 10-minute intervals. A total of 13,344 points in time 
(zigzag lines) are shown. This is the space of 'all operation.' 
Superimposing the existing alarm limits on the graph as red triangles as seen in Figure 6 makes 
the relationship between alarms and the operation immediately clear. Some alarm limits are 
inside the solid black area so give alarms at least some of the time; others are so far outside the 
black area that they may never annunciate at all. 
 
Figure 6: existing high and low alarm limits imposed on three months of operating data. 
The parallel plot allows a way to quickly evaluate existing and proposed alarm limits as well as 
set operating alarm limits at the edge of normal operation. The basics of setting limits with 
attention to human factors KPIs can be seen in earlier papers [Brooks 2012]. 
Alarm Limits in the Context of Operating History 
Discrepancy between alarm settings and historic operation can arise from many causes, have 
many effects on the alarm system, and show different behaviour in the parallel plot. There can be 
alarm limits in the middle of operation, alarm limits set so far outside operation they will never 
be violated, and operation that is in standing alarm. Other issues such as poor operation, 
redundancy, poor design may also contribute. Each of these are considered and some practical 
examples from real practice are given in this section. 
Figure 7 has a year of process operation for a process unit with superimposed high and low alarm 
limits in cyan. These limits are represented as the edges of a selection. That none of the data 
rows are coloured cyan indicates that at least one variable was in alarm at each point in time. 
Here there are at least four variables visible that were violating their alarm limits the entire year. 
For TI97, second from the left, the operation was over the high (only) limit of -25 for the entire 
year. This alarm has been effectively disabled. Whatever its design intention, it will never 
annunciate again unless the process moves significantly cooler and then warms again. 
Additionally, these alarms sit in the standing alarm list, making it difficult for the operator to use. 
The standing alarm list should ideally have zero alarms (a clean board), and the operator should 
be able to explain any alarms appearing there. This makes it very easy to check this list at the 
beginning and periodically through the shift to ascertain the current operating situation. If there 
are dozens of alarms permanently in this list, spotting small changes becomes impossible and 
operators tend to ignore the list completely. These may arise from maintenance issues, for 
instance sensor replacement, and the alarms should be temporarily disabled with procedures to 
ensure they are enabled again when the maintenance is performed. More serious are when they 
are set in relationship to an idea of normal process operation that has not recently, or even ever, 
been attained. In this case, examining the process nearby seems to show no suspicious operation. 
In fact, the alarms had been designed for a mode of heat integration that was used only briefly 
during plant commissioning and the alarms were no longer required. Another variable, FC118, in 
the same figure, shows a flow always at zero, a candidate for state-based suppression. 
 
Figure 7: A subset of alarm limits (cyan) superimposed on a year of normal process operation. 
Note evidence of variables always in alarm (TI97, TI98, TC100 at left), alarm limits buried in 
operations and alarms far outside operating history. 
Alarm limits in the middle of normal operation are usually the target of the most attention. These 
include frequently annunciating alarms, or ‘bad actors’, but also cases where the alarm is 
positioned between or among various operation modes where the process variable stays in alarm 
for hours or day at a time, effectively disabling it for those periods. The ‘bad actor’ terminology 
presupposes the fault is with the alarm limit, but it frequently that the alarm limit is reasonable 
and correct, but that operation cannot, or will not, operate within the limits. Addressing this 
operation often requires maintenance, engineering or other support and there may be a multi-step 
action plan for resolving the alarm issue. Where there are no faults, moving alarm limits to the 
edge of normal operation is the simplest and often appropriate action, but there are many cases 
that require consideration. 
One is actual physical constraints. These are a large component of limits in non-process areas, 
such as storage. Figure 8 shows a temperature in a reaction bypass that is routinely in alarm, and 
only goes briefly out of alarm when the bypass is used. During normal operations, it is clear that 
the alarm limit is not, or cannot be achieved by the operators. Inhibiting this alarm when the 
bypass isn’t in use might be considered, however, one intent is to keep reactants from 
condensing when the bypass is activated. Currently, the alarm annunciates going from abnormal 
to ‘normal’ operation and has less urgency and has been ignored for years, hiding the true issues. 
In this case, the alarm review brought attention to a vital maintenance issue. The alarm is useful 
and required where it is, engineering must be done to address why operation cannot currently 
meet it. These instances are relatively rare, but of very high operation and safety importance 
when discovered. 
 
Figure 8: Alarm limit of TI223 is normally in alarm. Time-trend plot on right shows only brief 
periods when it is not in alarm. 
Figure 9 shows a variable that has a very distinctive time trend. The parallel plot shows the upper 
limit buried in normal operation, suggesting that the alarm may be set too low, but the time trend 
illustrates a slow fill over days, followed by a quick drain (less than the 10 minute data 
frequency). Here, the level is under manual control and the high alarm is used as an action 
trigger for the operator. This is contrary to most definitions of an alarm, indicating an abnormal 
situation, which this (at least currently) is the normal operation of this tank. If the capability 
exists, moving the categorization of this to an alert and adding an alarm outside the normal 
response range would be appropriate, but that capability is not commonplace, so these sit in the 
alarm system alongside the other alarms. In this case, attempting to move the alarm limit outside 
normal operation would be unproductive and impossible. 
 
Figure 9: LI181 is frequently violated in normal operation, the level going above the high limit. 
Figure 10 shows a number of alarm limits far outside normal operation. These never show up on 
alarm reports, because they never annunciate. These have varying frequency, but are often 10-
30% of the configured alarm limits. Occasionally, these limits are reasonable, as there is 
normally no action until the limit is hit. For instance, a filter that is changed at every shutdown 
may have a limit on the pressure differential that would require a specific process interruption to 
change. There is no reason to bring the limits nearer the normal operation as no action should be 
taken for smaller values. In most cases, however, the limit can and should be brought in. This 
provides the operator earlier warning that the process is deviating from normal and allows earlier 
action to address the issue. TI67 is one of these where the control is very good and stable over a 
year, and the alarm range is so far out that significant process disturbances would have to occur. 
By bringing the limits in the operator has additional time to respond and a broader range of 
options before automatic systems are engaged. 
 
Figure 10: TI67 is among the variables with alarm limits set far outside normal variation. 
Redundant/correlated alarms are also easy to see from the history. Figure 11 shows two 
correlated levels that seem to occasionally vary in calibration. The high limits are seen to be at 
comparable levels, but the low will ring in at different times. Normally replacing these with a 
single configured alarm with a potential second deviation alarm would be preferable. 
Additionally, here, the high limit is well within normal operation and should be addressed. In this 
case, the process setpoint had shifted and the alarms were not adjusted.  
 
Figure 11: Redundant alarms. High alarm settings on LI79 and LI80 are at a similar level, and 
ring together. Low alarm settings are at two different levels. 
Figure 12 shows another relationship between two related variables. Here we have the output 
temperature of two parallel fin-fan coolers. The alarm limits here are buried in normal operation 
and cause frequent alarms. In looking at the appropriate level for these limits a new problem is 
encountered. There are three main populations in the scatter plot between the two variables. The 
bottom left shows the normal correlation between these two variables, going up and down 
together as process temperatures or ambient temperature changes. The two populations above 
and to the right of this population consist conditions where one of the two fans has tripped and 
stopped running. This leads to an increase in the outlet temperature of the corresponding cooler. 
The alarms are meant to detect this condition. Two different strategies have been used in placing 
the alarm limits. On the x-axis, TI35, the alarm limit has been positioned just above the 
maximum normal temperature. As can be seen that it intersects the tripped population, it will 
miss alarming on trips when the temperature is cool. On the other hand, on the y-axis, TI37 has 
an alarm limit positioned below the minimum tripped temperature but well inside the normal 
operation, causing the operator to doubt whether the alarm is ever accurate. In this case the alarm 
must be redesigned, looking at heat across the exchanger, or a deviation from process or ambient 
temperatures as no alarm limit can properly do the job on either of these variables. This also 
illustrates the general case that the limits and process constraints we are often interested in have 
multi-dimensional and even complex constraints. This can be approached with higher 
dimensionality models and better approximations of the operating envelope than simple single-
range alarms [Brooks 2004]. 
 
Figure 12: Alarm limits on two cooler output temperatures. Note three distributions of the 
temperature relationship. 
Another use of process history is quantifying process rates-of-change (ROC). Maximum rates of 
process movement are dependent on system operation, and the developing fault/situation. 
Ideally, response times could be calculated for all possible faults. In practice, this is infeasible for 
most process upset scenarios and so common or arbitrary rates of change are chosen for broad 
classes of variables in a plant. While still of smaller magnitude than what is expected during and 
actual process disturbance, ‘normal’ rate of change will provide a better estimate of time to 
respond. This can be taken from process data, avoiding noise issues by considering, for instance, 
10 minute data to capture rate-of-change. This will necessarily give a lower bound on the 
maximum expected rate-of-change, alternatively an upper bound on the required stand-off 
between alarm and safety system set points. This can also highlight undersized equipment or lack 
of capability, for instance where the normal rate of change can be 6% of range a minute and a ten 
minute response time is desired for both high and low alarms. Regardless of process operation 
and capability, such a set of alarm limits is impossible without process changes. 
The images so far have focused on a single set of alarm limits. Often it is instructive to bring in 
multiple sets on the same graph. As a more complete example, Figure 13 shows four sets of 
limits and their relationship to process history, quickly illustrating the concentric arrangement of 
normal operation, operator alarms pre-trip and safety limits. Additional sets, including integrity 
limits can easily be accommodated. 
 
Figure 13: four sets of alarm limits with process history. Safety trip levels are shown in dark 
blue, hihi/lolo limits in green, hi/lo limits in red, and pvervious hi/lo limits in light blue. 
Coloration shows periods where no alarms of that class were active. 
Conclusion 
Determining the appropriate values for alarm limits is a key part of rationalization and ongoing 
alarm maintenance. Today, this is often done with at best limited reference to process history, but 
this history is essential in driving operator action, alarm placement, and plant operation 
improvements. Both in determining the context of alarms in ways that alarm logs, alarm statistics 
and even single-variable histories cannot capture, but also driving process improvement as often 
alarm problems are symptomatic of deeper process problems. Accessing and visualizing this 
information easily and quickly during the review process is key to utilizing it efficiently. Alarm 
limits can only be evaluated for consistency with regard to their created enclosing hypercube and 
the normal operating envelope with access to the process history. With the proper tools, adding 
process history to the alarm review process doesn’t slow the process, but tends to speed 
discussions and conclusions, produces better alarms, and reduces the long-term cost of alarm 
maintenance. 
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